The OpenBSD project team. Purveyors of a FREE, multi-platform 4.4BSD-based UNIX-like operating system. Their efforts place emphasis on portability, standardization, correctness, security, and cryptography. And OpenBSD really concentrates on those last two. OpenBSD is simply the best choice for multi-user environments. It is the flawed assumption that security mechanisms can be adequately provided in layers above the operating system. A perfect security application cannot make up for flawed or absent security features within the OS kernel. It is the classic example of building a castle on a swamp. You can build a strong fortress, but it makes no difference if it slowly sinks into the ground. In this article, we retrofit the OpenBSD kernel with some additional security. This article is about cracking the whip. It's a prime example of security being (possibly) inconvenient. But by making things potentially a bit more difficult for normal users, we hope to severely hamper would-be attackers. Two effective ways of doing this are through limited program execution via path and credential checks and privacy restrictions. This article is a follow-up to my P52-06 article on hardening the Linux kernel. Herein the reader will find several patches designed to harden a multi-user OpenBSD box. These patches can be broken down into two areas: privacy restriction and execution restriction (more on these below). The patches contained here should be used in conjunction with a savvy for intelligent administration; if you can't recompile a kernel, stop here.
OpenBSD Kernel Enhancements
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